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The intervention by governments in October 2008
appears to have succeeded in stopping market panic
about Europe’s largest banks – for some time at
least. The massive plan that combines liquidity and
capital injections and guarantees was an appropriate
reaction to the urgency of the moment.But the same
urgency had the consequence that the plan was not
informed by consideration of its long-term conse-
quences. We can be sure that credit conditions will
return to normal at some point in time,in a few years
at the very latest. What remains entirely undeter-
mined, however, is the shape the European financial
sector will present itself in whenever the dust from
this crisis settles.
There can be little doubt that the financial industry
will experience significant restructuring in the mean-
time: market developments in late September and
early October have made amply clear that its earlier
structure was unsustainable.Now that the entire sec-
tor has been brought under the umbrella of govern-
ment guarantee, restructuring trends are bound to
depend heavily on policy decisions, whether linked
or not to the implementation of the plan itself (see
Véron 2008). In other words, now that politicians
have (albeit temporarily) eclipsed market forces as
the lords of the financial industry, they have become
responsible for its future. It would be irresponsible
for them to much delay some hard thinking about
what this future should look like.
Europe’s banking integration at the crossroads
One key aspect of Europe’s banking industry that
will be affected by public policy choices is its degree
of cross-border integration. In the past ten years,
cross-border integration has made rapid progress,
due to the expansion of Western European banks’
activities in Central and Eastern Europe and to a
limited number of large cross-border acquisitions
such as Santander/Abbey (2004) and UniCredit/
HVB (2005).Consider the EU’s 15 largest banks (by
market capitalization, measured on 30 September
2008). In 2007, eight of them, or more than half, had
at least one-third of their total European revenue
yielded from outside the home countries, against
none ten years earlier. For four of them (Deutsche
Bank, ING, Nordea and UniCredit), the proportion
was even more than 50 percent: these banks derive
less revenue from their home country than from the
rest of their European operations.1
This striking development, however, remains unequal
and the degree of cross-border banking integration
varies significantly across Europe. In four of the five
largest EU economies (Germany, France, Italy and
Spain), foreign-owned banks are generally marginal
players, the two only significant exceptions being
HVB in Bavaria (part of UniCredit since 2005) and
BNL in Italy (part of BNP Paribas since 2006). In the
United Kingdom, Santander has built a significant
retail operation – and of course, banks from all over
the world are present on the wholesale markets – but
none of the domestic banks (Barclays, HBOS, HSBC,
Lloyds TSB,RBS,Standard Chartered) has expanded
much on the continent. Further north, Scandinavia
has seen a vivid intra-regional integration, but the
presence of non-Scandinavian banks there remains
limited.Altogether,Europe’s large banks are general-
ly less internationalised than large European compa-
nies in other sectors (Véron 2006).
Even within these limits, though, cross-border bank-
ing integration appears to have brought significant
economic benefit where it has been sufficiently
developed to have an impact, most strikingly in
Central and Eastern Europe. In these countries, the
strong catch-up growth of the past few years has
been fuelled not only by foreign direct investment
but also by the easily available credit from Western
* Bruegel, Brussels.
1 Author’s calculations based on corporate disclosures. I thank
Martin Saldias Zambrana for his highly valuable research assis-
tance in assembling these numbers.banks which themselves benefited from favourable
refinancing conditions (one negative aspect of this
credit expansion, however, has been the high share
of foreign-denominated lending). Cross-border
banking integration has also contributed to a rapid
distribution of new financial products and service
offerings throughout the EU.On the whole,it is like-
ly to have contributed to a more efficient allocation
of capital, thus allowing better access to finance and
better returns on investment for companies and
households across the EU, even though quantifica-
tion of such effects remains notoriously difficult (see
London Economics 2002).
However, the cross-border integration of the past
decade has taken place in a climate marked by low
credit spreads and relatively low concern about sys-
temic risk. The public policies which have had most
impact during that phase have been those carried out
at European level on competition and the internal
market.The European Commission has played a pow-
erful role as enabler of cross-border consolidation 
by ensuring that prudential controls over national
banking sectors were not abused for protectionist
purposes. Landmark cases have included Santander-
Champalimaud in Portugal (1999), takeover bids on
Antonveneta and BNL in Italy (2005), and the com-
bination of banking assets held by HVB and
UniCredit in Poland (2005–06).
Prudential regulation, meanwhile, has not kept pace
with market developments. While many banks were
internationalising at a rapid pace, supervision has
remained essentially national, governed by national
laws and carried out by national authorities. A mod-
icum of coordination has been brought by the cre-
ation in 2004 of the Committee of European Banking
Supervisors (CEBS) in the framework of the so-called
Lamfalussy architecture for financial regulation, but
CEBS has a merely advisory role,no binding decision-
making powers of its own, and few permanent staff.
Even before the credit crisis erupted in the summer of
2007, many voices have expressed concern that the
fragmentation of Europe’s supervisory framework
made it increasingly difficult to fulfil its financial sta-
bility aims (see Véron 2007a;Decressin,Faruquee and
Fonteyne 2007).2
With the major repricing of risk and widely shared
expectation of “reregulatory” initiatives resulting
from the financial crisis since August 2007, the equa-
tion of cross-border banking integration in Europe is
likely to be fundamentally modified. Especially since
the brutal degradation of the interbank lending mar-
ket in September 2008, financial stability concerns
have taken centre stage and banks have been brought
on an unprecedented scale under the protection of
their home country government. In some cases, this
has resulted in the immediate unwinding of previous
cross-border combinations, as when the government
of the Netherlands unexpectedly announced the
nationalisation of the Dutch operations of Fortis and
Fortis’ share of ABN Amro, invoking depositor pro-
tection concerns, on 3 October 2008. Similarly, RBS
has signalled a downsizing of its business abroad to
concentrate on its core UK retail activity (see Larsen
and Tucker,2008).In an era of scarce capital and gov-
ernments’ overwhelming concern of maintaining
credit in their domestic economies, it is likely that the
short-term trend will be a reduction in the interna-
tional operations of most European banks compared
with the domestic ones. Simply put, support from
home-country taxpayers cannot sustainably be used
to shore up credit operations in other countries.
Granted, cross-border consolidation can also result
from the turmoil,as when BNP Paribas acquired most
Belgian and Luxembourg operations of Fortis in early
October, but under the current circumstances such
cases will not compensate the powerful drive towards
renationalisation of European banking.
As a result, policymakers have a Gordian knot to cut
now. On the one hand, the collapse of trust of early
October forced them to take charge of the banking
industry and will necessarily result in a reregulation
drive.Conducted by national governments,this would
tend to refragment the European banking industry
along geographical lines, with detrimental economic
consequences. On the other hand, existing cross-bor-
der banks need a credible regulatory and supervisory
framework that respects the interests of their stake-
holders in the plurality of countries in which they
operate.The earlier belief that banks could live their
lives somewhat independently of public oversight,and
support in crisis times, has been proven a myth. This
humbling lesson applies as much to Europe’s cross-
border banks as to the US investment banks, which
have either disappeared or sought the protection of
US authorities by becoming regulated banks.In other
terms, the challenge facing policymakers, beyond the
short-term fixes announced in October, is to achieve
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reregulation without refragmentation of Europe’s
financial services industry.
Policy options and the case for EU level authority
How to square this circle has been discussed exten-
sively among EU Member States since the crisis
erupted,and even before.However,the discussion has
bumped repeatedly on the familiar obstacles to insti-
tution-building at European level.In individual coun-
tries,either central banks have a mandate to supervise
banks, or a separate agency, such as the Financial
Services Authority (FSA) in the United Kingdom,
carries out the supervisory tasks in liaison with the
central bank and government. When a bank or a
financial group expands operations to several coun-
tries,the approach has traditionally been to introduce
closer cooperation between the home-country super-
visors and its counterparts in other countries.
However, the degree of internationalisation of some
European banks, a feature that could only accentuate
if cross-border integration does not stop,is difficult to
reconcile with any primacy of the home-country
supervisor in intergovernmental-style arrangements.
This is especially the case where foreign-owned bank
have major systemic importance in host countries.For
example, Fortis, the largest Belgian bank, is now
expected to shortly become part of BNP Paribas. In
Finland the market leader is Nordea, headquartered
in Sweden,and the number three is Sampo,owned by
Danske Bank. In Poland, Pekao is the second-largest
bank with a market share approaching 20 percent,
higher than its parent UniCredit’s market share in
Italy. In Romania, the three dominant banks are
BCR, BRD and Raiffeisen Romania, respectively
controlled by Erste Bank (of Vienna), Société
Générale (of Paris) and Raiffeisen (of Vienna).
Having such systemically important local players
supervised at group level by a foreign authority
accountable to foreign stakeholders creates severe
political tension, especially in times of stress.To alle-
viate it, the European Commission has proposed to
create ‘supervisory colleges’ under the auspices of
CEBS, for which an institutional underpinning
would be provided by the Capital Requirements
Directive (CRD),currently undergoing revision.But
these colleges, which will further add to the already
dizzying complexity of committees of regulatory
authorities in Europe, cannot by themselves solve
the underlying tension. Moreover, they will intro-
duce an element of competition among regulatory
structures which will mirror the competition among
banks themselves. For example, in Finland Nordea
would be supervised by a college led by Sweden’s
Finansinspektionen, Sampo by another college led
by Denmark’s Finanstilsynet, and OP-Pohjola by
Finland’s own supervisor, Rahoitustarkastus. Even
admitting close cooperation, the incentives to sup-
port national players are such that this de facto reg-
ulatory competition is likely to result in a ‘race to the
bottom’ as often as in a “race to the top”.
Supervisory colleges are thus insufficient to resolve
the challenge of consistent and effective supervision
of Europe’s cross-border financial groups, and their
expected reinforcement by the revised CRD,intend-
ed as a step forward, is therefore in effect likely to
create more problems than it can solve. CEBS, the
committee of European banking supervisors,will not
be in a position to credibly ensure such consistency
and effectiveness, because as an advisory committee
to the European Commission it has no binding deci-
sion-making authority of its own, and moreover its
members are precisely the national supervisors (and
central banks) on which it would have to exert over-
sight.For the same reasons that self-regulation in the
private financial industry has been found wanting of
late, it is illusory to think that Europe’s national
supervisory authorities can be effectively disciplined
by a committee formed by themselves. A credible
supervisory framework for cross-border financial
groups will require more than coordination mecha-
nisms among national authorities. It will necessarily
entail actual delegation by national authorities of
key tasks and responsibilities: such delegation to
another national authority accountable to its own
national constituency is in many cases politically
untenable, but delegation could be done to a jointly
governed actor in which each individual country has
a stake. In effect, the clear conclusion of the numer-
ous multilateral discussions carried out in the past
few months is that no sustainable framework for the
supervision of cross-border banks can be defined
without corresponding new institutions at suprana-
tional level.
If some form of EU-level supervisory authority is
necessary to meet today’s challenge of reregulation
without refragmentation of Europe’s banking indus-
try, would it be sufficient? As the events of the past
few months have illustrated, government interven-
tion in banking crises is multifaceted and often
involves significant commitment of public money.
There are currently no legally available instrumentsto commit significant financial means for banking
rescues at EU level.3 On 1 October 2008, several
prominent economists have together called for the
EU to pool financial resources to inject capital into
ailing banks,4 and that same week the French
Presidency of the EU has briefly appeared to pro-
mote similar ideas. However, one lesson learnt from
the frantic days of early October is that even under
considerable financial pressure, Member States
remain very reluctant to share financial resources in
a federal framework beyond what is already provid-
ed for within the EU budget and the strictly defined
mandates of the European Central Bank and the
European Investment Bank. This reluctance is cer-
tainly linked to the absence of a tax-raising capacity
at EU level, a key feature of the Union’s current
institutional arrangements. The same reasons make
it politically difficult to envisage “ex-ante” burden
sharing arrangements as have been proposed by
experienced observers (Goodhart and Schoenmaker
2006), which would provide ready-made formulas
for the sharing of public costs in case of a multina-
tional public rescue.5
But while the absence of federal financial arrange-
ments undoubtedly makes the management of bank-
ing crises more difficult, it does not fatally under-
mine the credibility of EU-level banking supervi-
sion, assuming an EU-level supervisory authority
can be created. This is because having centralized
information on financial groups would go a long way
towards resolving the coordination problems cur-
rently resulting from geographical fragmentation,
even in the absence of corresponding centralization
of financial resources. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that information does not flow easily between
national supervisors, especially during crises – even
if the official position of authorities is generally to
deny the existence of such difficulties, for legitimate
face-saving reasons. By contrast, when constrained
by necessity, national governments have proved
ready to decide quickly to pool financial resources in
joint interventions, as has been the case for the res-
cues of Fortis (by Belgium, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands) and Dexia (by Belgium and France) in
the last days of September 2008. What has proven
most difficult in these two cases has not been the
joint commitment of funds, but the subsequent joint
management of a fast-changing situation, eventually
leading, in the case of Fortis, to the decision by the
Netherlands to nationalise the bank’s Dutch assets
separately.This experience can certainly not be gen-
eralised to all future cross-border banking crises,but
it tends to suggest that the absence of ex-ante feder-
al budgetary arrangements may not be an insur-
mountable obstacle to efficient public action, if ade-
quate analysis and recommendations for Member
States’ decisions were to be provided by an authori-
ty at EU level which would be sufficiently account-
able to individual countries to be trusted.
The possible features of a European supervisor
Any debate about establishing new institutions at
EU level is often emotionally charged, and easily
caricatured as the creation of all-powerful, opaque
bureaucratic monsters (see Lodge 2008). A realistic
blueprint for a European supervisory authority
would need to carefully calibrate its mandate and
size in order to limit them as much as is compatible
with its envisaged mission, in compliance with the
European principle of subsidiarity.It can be suspect-
ed that were European leaders to decide to found
such a body, it would be under difficult conditions
linked to market or economic stress. For this reason,
there is a case for a prior debate on what could be
the key features of an EU-level supervisory authori-
ty, even at a time when the prospect for such a step
may appear remote to many observers.
Mission
The organisation of financial regulatory and supervi-
sory tasks varies considerably from one Member
State to another in the European Union. In some
Member States,the central bank is in charge of most
or all of the supervisory function, as is the case in
France or Italy, while in Germany supervision is
divided between the central bank and an indepen-
dent agency (BaFin). Furthermore, in countries like
Britain supervision of individual financial services
firms is entirely separated from the central bank:it is
one of the missions of the FSA. In a different direc-
tion, the Netherlands have implemented the so-
called ‘Twin Peaks’ model, in which conduct-of-busi-
ness regulation and prudential supervision are car-
ried out by two different agencies even though they
apply to the same regulated entities (see Taylor
1995). Countries often reform their arrangements as
a consequence of financial crises or financial scan-
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dals, as Britain did with the creation of the FSA in
1997 following the successive failures of BCCI
(1991) and Barings (1995). However, it does not
seem that any one organisational model is unam-
biguously superior to the others. For example, in the
past decade there has been a trend towards separat-
ing supervision from central banking, emulating a
model initially pioneered by Scandinavian countries
following the crises of the early 1990s. But the credit
crisis of 2007–08 has tended to shift the emphasis
back to the linkages between the two functions.
Spain,a country in which the central bank has exten-
sive authority to supervise the banks, has been seen
to have recently avoided some of the mistakes made
in neighbouring countries (Tett 2008).
Therefore, there is no single model that would
impose itself as the only possible one at European
level. However, the already mentioned subsidiarity
concern would suggest limiting the European super-
visor’s mission to the core function of prudential
supervision of financial services firms, with no
responsibility for other regulatory functions such as
protecting investors or ensuring market integrity or
the quality of financial disclosures.This does not nec-
essarily mean that such other functions should
always remain at national level.For example,there is
a strong case for transferring the enforcement func-
tion for the implementation of International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by European
listed companies to a supranational entity account-
able to national securities regulators (Véron 2007b).
But there is no need for this function to be combined
with that of prudential supervision. On the contrary,
trying to bundle several different missions into a
“single” European financial regulator would likely
be counterproductive.
The same considerations would weigh against
entrusting the European Central Bank (ECB) with
the role of European supervisor.Beyond the issue of
geographical scope (see below),an EU-level central-
bank-cum-financial-supervisor would arguably com-
bine more tasks than the current EU institutions
allow for:debates about such a powerful institution’s
autonomy from politicians and democratic account-
ability, already heated in the case of the ECB, would
be further exacerbated, with the risk of endangering
the independence of monetary policy. This is accen-
tuated by the fact that supervision often has a closer
working relationship with elected governments than
monetary policy does, especially when it comes to
crisis management in which public funds may be
used.There is no question that supervision should be
carried out in close operational relationship with the
ECB and other relevant central banks, but the insti-
tutions should be distinct.
Sectoral scope
The importance of an adequate scope of financial reg-
ulation has been highlighted by the credit crisis, espe-
cially in the United States where the unregulated
“shadow banking system” has been found to interact
with banks in ways that have been sometimes detri-
mental to financial stability. This debate is perhaps
less acute in Europe,where investment banking oper-
ations are generally included in the scope of supervi-
sors together with retail banking.However,European
countries vary on whether they bring insurance under
the same authority as banking supervision, as has
been the general trend of reforms in the past few
years.On the one hand,insurance companies have not
had the same systemic impact as banks in the devel-
opments of the crisis so far; on the other hand, many
financial services firms have both banking and insur-
ance activities,some of them of systemic relevance on
a pan-European scale (such as ING).
A related question is whether currently unregulated
financial market participants, such as hedge funds,
should be encompassed. This aspect is likely to be
the matter of discussion at international level. The
blueprint for a European supervisor could be corre-
spondingly adapted to any enlargement of the sec-
toral scope of financial regulation overall.
Geographical scope
The European supervisor should be an EU institu-
tion, because only the EU offers a sufficiently strong
legal and political framework for such a key public
function to be carried out at supranational level.Thus,
its authority could extend to the whole EU but not
beyond.For example,Swiss banks could in no case be
under its jurisdictions, even though bilateral agree-
ments could be envisaged with the Swiss authorities,
as currently exist between Switzerland and individual
EU Member States, or with the United States.
Whether the supervisor’s geographical scope should
be less than the entire EU is a matter of political dis-
cussion.There is no strong case to limit it to the euro
area, because banking integration and monetary
integration seem to be two different dynamics.Most
cross-border banking groups in the EU combine sig-nificant operations inside and outside the euro area:
Santander,Nordea,UniCredit or Raiffeisen are typ-
ical examples. Moreover, the centrality of London,
as Europe’s financial hub and location of a large
part of wholesale operations for many of Europe’s
largest banks, means that the benefits of pooling
supervision at supranational level would be signifi-
cantly reduced if the United Kingdom were outside
the geographical scope.As a consequence, there is a
strong case for a scope which would include all EU
Member States.
Division of scope with national supervisors
The subsidiarity principle dictates that a European
supervisor should have jurisdiction over only those
banks and financial groups that can not adequately be
supervised by national authorities acting alone.Under
that principle, only large financial firms with signifi-
cant operations in several countries should be super-
vised at EU level, leaving the vast majority of
Europe’s 8,000-odd banks with an unchanged,nation-
al supervisory framework. The cut-off between
national and EU-level supervision could be defined
either by compulsory thresholds – any bank above a
given size and a given degree of internationalization
measured by key operating parameters such as rev-
enue, employees or assets, say, would be included in
the European supervisor’s jurisdiction – or on a vol-
untary basis, supposing that the cost savings resulting
from one single supervisory partner would be a suffi-
cient incentive for all relevant groups to submit them-
selves to EU-level oversight. The second option, vol-
untary registration, would introduce an element of
regulatory competition between the national and
European levels, whose possible consequences would
need to be carefully weighed. In any event, the num-
ber of groups subject to EU-level supervision can be
expected to be no more than a few dozen in total,thus
preserving a major role for most existing national
authorities.
Financial groups supervised at EU level may be sub-
ject to a specific legal regime in order to establish a
proper basis for their supervision and ensure a suffi-
ciently level playing field.This could take the form of
a European banking charter,supported by appropri-
ate EU legislation (Decressin and Cihak 2007).
Functions and organisation
The core of a European supervisor’s role should be
an unconstrained ability to collect and analyse infor-
mation from the supervised entities. To have credi-
bility, it should have direct access in principle to
supervised firms to obtain information, including
possibly by sending inspectors on site within its geo-
graphical scope.In practice,however,it should lever-
age a working relationship with, and delegation to,
national supervisors in order to benefit from their
advantage of proximity, which can greatly facilitate
both access to information and understanding of it.
How concretely and exactly this relationship can be
organised would be an important operational aspect
of setting up a European supervisor.
There is also an important debate required on what
tools the European supervisor should have beyond
access to supervisory information and the means to
analyse it. How far to go in entrusting it with coer-
cive powers on the behaviour of supervised entities,
as well as a formal role in crisis management and res-
olution, would also depend on the legal basis for its
establishment, the discussion of which is beyond the
scope of this contribution. But even a role limited to
the collection and processing of information at EU
level would be a substantial addition to the current
situation, in which no single public authority can
build a complete picture of the European operations
of a large, cross-border financial group.
A European supervisor would also have a role to
play if, as could be decided as a consequence of the
crisis, it is decided to introduce a mechanism of
“dynamic provisioning” to allow the assessment of
capital adequacy to take into account the effects of
multi-year financial cycles.If part of a global supervi-
sory framework, such calculation may need to
include a regional as well as a local/national and pos-
sibly a global component, in whose determination
supervisors could play a role together with other
institutions including central banks.
Governance and funding
As already mentioned, compared with monetary
policy, supervision of financial firms is a role that
involves closer interaction with governments and
especially treasury departments, as crisis manage-
ment may involve decisions that directly affect indi-
viduals and firms as well as the direct use of taxpay-
ers’ money – a fact that recent developments of the
credit crisis have amply illustrated. Therefore, the
governance of a European supervisor should be con-
ducive to the establishment of strong and trustful
relationships with national governments, especially
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as the prospect of EU-level financial resources for
intervention in the banking system remains a remote
and unlikely one at this point of time.
This would mean that the European supervisor
should be accountable to the European Parliament
and Council, but perhaps also build direct account-
ability towards national constituencies and especial-
ly national parliaments, at least as far as countries
are directly affected by its decisions.
Similarly, one could imagine direct funding of the
supervisor’s yearly budget (which should probably
remain modest in any case, compared to that of
other EU institutions) by Member States. Private-
sector funding of supervision, which exists in several
EU Member States, could also be envisaged as a
complementary or alternative route, with due con-
sideration of the risk of capture of the supervisor by
the supervised industry that it may entail.
Location
Where to headquarter a European supervisor may
sound an ancillary and secondary concern, but experi-
ence suggests that it could be a significant aspect of the
discussion about its establishment.While this decision
will depend on the inevitable horse-trading among
member state, it should also be made to maximise the
effectiveness and/or legitimacy of supervision.
To that end, three possible locations come to the
fore: London, where a significant part of European
banks’ riskiest and most complex activities take
place; Brussels, the centre of political power at
European level, where the European Parliament in
particular holds most of its hearings and where
Council committees meet most often;and Frankfurt,
seat of the European Central Bank with which a
European supervisor would need to establish a close
working relationship.
Notwithstanding political considerations, no other
place in Europe comes close to these three in terms
of suitability to host a European supervisor. The
choice among the three is far from obvious and will
partly depend on choices on other aspects of the new
body’s setup.
The political outlook
The decision to establish a European supervisor for
Europe’s largest cross-border financial groups, even
with a limited mandate, would be a significant step
compared with previous developments of Europe’s
financial regulatory framework.This is not a decision
that policymakers can take lightly.It may also be the
case, depending on the legal basis chosen for such a
decision (an aspect whose discussion is not included
in this paper), that such a decision would require
unanimity of EU Member States.
In the past, opposition to such a project has been dri-
ven in part by national authorities defending their tra-
ditional turf, and by national reluctance to delegate
sovereignty, but also by concerns that financial sector
oversight was too delicate a matter to be dealt with in
the complex context of the European Union, with its
multiple institutional constraints. By itself, so the
argument goes, an EU institution could not be reac-
tive, efficient and accountable enough to properly
perform the supervisory tasks in the short timeframes
imposed by the marketplace. This is an important
argument which cannot be ignored. However, the
obstacle it creates to reform appears less insurmount-
able since the ECB, by its deft handling of the finan-
cial crisis from the early days of August 2007, has
proved that an EU institution could be as reactive and
decisive as any other in times of stress.
A parallel argument is that EU institutions may by
their very nature have a more heavy-handed, pre-
scriptive, rules-based and politicised approach than
national ones. However, especially in the current
context of reregulation, this argument does not have
any strong empirical basis. On the contrary, it could
be argued that placing supervision of certain finan-
cial groups at EU rather than national level reduces
the likelihood of privileged special treatment that
could be detrimental to overall financial stability,
and taxpayers’ interests. This is actually a general
feature of institutional regulatory arrangements, as
has been described before the eruption of the finan-
cial crisis by Adam Posen, in a parallel observation
of the American and European experiences: “when
US economic policy decisions were left to the state
level,they tended to be reactionary,just as they were
on civil rights.[…] the more the central body has had
authority over economic policy,the greater the liber-
alizing influence […]. The alternative to a strong
Brussels is not a decentralized free market and min-
imal government interference. It is greater political
capture of economic policymaking and abuse of
authority by member states and subnational govern-
ments. […] In fact, the European experience shows
that enforcement of market integration,competitionpolicy, disclosures and transparency are what really
brought the economic benefits of European Union –
and that enforcement came during the periods when
and in areas where the Commission had competence
independent of the member states’ specific wishes.
When Brussels has been strong,it has been liberaliz-
ing, at least internally within the European Union,
and that has paid off.When the member states have
taken away authority from Brussels, the effect has
been reactionary horse-trading and back-scratching
[…]” (Posen 2007).
A frequently mentioned concern is that any creation
of a new financial authority at EU level, however
restricted its initial mandate, would automatically
lead to “mission creep” and undue expansion of that
mandate to an extent that would suffocate and side-
line national financial regulation.This is, however, a
matter that can be addressed by adequate legal pro-
visions.One could imagine,for example,that the spe-
cific description of the mandate of the European
supervisor in its articles of association (or other
founding document) could be modified only by a
supermajority or even unanimity of the member
states. The decade-long experience of Member
States with the ECB illustrates that, even in cases
when the temptation of mission creep may be pre-
sent – as is seen by some to have been the case, say,
with the Target 2 Securities project – there can be
enough institutional safeguards for institutional drift
to be safely prevented.
A different line of argument against the creation of a
European supervisor is that it would not be sufficient
to meet its policy aims. This argument runs in two
strands: first, that without supranational financial
resources the creation of a supranational supervisory
instrument would have no material effect; second,
that cross-border financial integration is happening
at global level and that its challenges cannot be met
unless global supervisory institutions are duly
empowered. Both points evidently contain an ele-
ment of truth, but not to the extent that they would
justify policy inertia.As previously argued,even with-
out federal financial resources a European supervi-
sor could significantly alter – and improve – the
dynamics of decision by providing ‘the necessary ser-
vices of multilateral coordination and political
buffering’ (Pauly 2007) which no existing structure
can offer in the present setting, and which can con-
tribute to substantially reduce the eventual price tag
to taxpayers by assessing the risks early enough and
accelerate decision-making among member states.
On the latter item,it must be noted that even if a few
European banks, mainly headquartered in Spain and
the United Kingdom, have very significant retail
operations overseas, the bulk of cross-border expan-
sion of Europe’s large banks over the past decade or
so has occurred inside the EU.More to the point,the
EU offers a framework of law and political account-
ability that has no equivalent at global level. And a
European supervisor would be in a much better posi-
tion than a fragmented collection of national ones to
negotiate internationally,be it in international discus-
sions about shared norms (such as the Basel accord
on capital adequacy, or IFRS) or in multilateral ones
about particular financial groups, those headquar-
tered in Europe with overseas activities as well as
those headquartered outside the EU which have
developed significant European operations.
Conclusion
The establishment of a European supervisor for the
largest cross-border financial groups in Europe would
be a significant step towards enabling the necessary
reregulation of the European financial system in the
wake of the ongoing crisis, without leading to eco-
nomically (and politically) harmful financial refrag-
mentation. The deep-running scepticism and resis-
tance to such a project, which are more marked in
some member states than others,need to be balanced
with the present dangers inherent in the status quo.
Would a European supervisor as is advocated in this
paper have made a difference, had it been in place
from the outset of the current crisis? Certainly not for
the likes of Sachsen LB,IKB,Northern Rock or Hypo
Real Estate, whose supervisory regime would not
have been affected in view of their predominantly
domestic activity.However,supranational supervision
may have helped react earlier to the developments at
Dexia,Fortis,and possibly other banks which have not
been through changes as dramatic but have had to
face significant upheavals nevertheless. More impor-
tantly still, it would have allowed more comprehen-
sive and comparative information of national policy-
makers in the context of the massive intervention plan
decided by European governments in mid-October,
whose implementation is permanently at risk of run-
ning divergent courses in different countries, to prob-
lematic overall effect.
But once again,the main outcome at stake is a mid-
term one rather than immediate crisis management.
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The persistence and development of pan-European
financial groups, in an era of reregulation, will
depend crucially on the existence of a credible
supervisory framework which cannot be provided
in the absence of institution-building at EU level.
This is also a matter of global competition. Take
other, non-financial sectors: in the automotive
industry, often a symbol of economic nationalism
but one in which the European market is genuinely
integrated, five of the world’s top ten firms6 are
headquartered in Europe. By contrast, in the media
industry, which has a long history of fragmentation
along national lines, Europe is home to only two of
the top ten. Will European banks in the future be
more like its automakers, or its media companies?
The answer to this question will depend largely on
decisions made by governments about their super-
visory framework.
The challenge in Europe echoes a global debate.
Global financial firms have been key agents of the
globalisation of the past ten or twenty years. If they
retract to a national or regional playground, globalisa-
tion may be deprived of one of its key supporting struc-
tures.The world has remembered the mistake that was
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930,and is unlikely to
raise barriers to trade as a knee-jerk reaction to the cri-
sis – but a refragmentation of the global economic
landscape may also take other forms than eight
decades ago (Bowers 2008). Evidently, policymakers
have a duty to focus on the short-term aspects of the
financial and economic crisis.But in so doing,they must
also keep in mind the long-term consequences.
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